

o Cruise missiles -- already changing military thinking -- are in their infancy and offer revolutionary potential. Future characteristics such as "zero CEP" accuracy at large stand-off ranges and supersonic dash, at relatively low cost, will fundamentally change land, sea, and air warfare.

o High energy lasers.

o New forms of undersea submarine detection.

o New capabilities in space, including satellites used for targeting, missile guidance and surveillance.

o Applications of the Space Shuttle.

~~o Aircraft with low observables to make them virtually undetectable and with V/STOL capabilities.~~

o New forms of defense against ballistic missiles.

All of these and others will dominate future thinking and our future programs. A vigorous technology base must be created now.

NATO STANDARDIZATION

There is increasing recognition of the importance of achieving efficiencies and improved effectiveness through standard and interoperable systems in NATO.

I feel the US should take the lead in bringing this about through a policy of international cooperation with our Allies which will encompass joint industrial programs, licensing both ways, and co-production.

We have been pursuing this goal vigorously. We have made a great deal of progress despite the complexities of national interests, international economic factors, and industrial pressure groups here and abroad. But we still have a long way to go. The Culver-Nunn legislation has been very supportive of this effort.

Mr. President, as the controversy over the stealth program continues, let me address a few of what I consider to be the essential points.

First, despite the recent flurry of charges from past, current, and would-be public officials, there is simply no evidence of planned, high-level Administration leaks about stealth. In fact, not only has the current Administration increased spending on stealth one-hundred fold, but three years ago it, for the first time ever, classified the very existence of the program, and since has kept knowledge of it restricted to a named list of individuals.

Second, going back at least as far as 1976, there have been published reports of attempts to reduce radar detectability, to make aircraft "invisible," as it were. It is inconceivable to me that Soviet analysts missed these various references, so we can assume they have been aware for some time that the U.S. was engaged in such efforts.

Third, as the stealth program continued to become larger and more expensive, its existence would have had to be made public in the near future anyway. The existence of a program of this size, with hundreds of contractor personnel and government officials

involved, could not be kept secret much longer--under any circumstances.

Fourth, a rash of press reports of stealth occurred last month leaving the Pentagon no practical recourse but to acknowledge the existence of the program--admittedly slightly earlier than they wanted to or would have had to, in the absence of such press reports. I do not see how, in August 1980, the Soviets, who already knew from open literature about such work, could have been tricked into believing that there really was no such program. They are not naive men in the Kremlin, although some in this country apparently would have us believe they are.

Lastly, the Pentagon has now drawn a clear line between what little has been declassified regarding stealth and everything else about the program. It behooves all of us to honor that line and to do all we can to see that others do as well.

Let me also make two observations in passing. One is that I cannot help but be struck by what one distinguished journalist has called the "selective indignation" on the part of some of those who are most loudly and fervently decrying alleged leaks about steal. One wonders why all of these same voices were not raised in indignation when earlier leaks occurred about U.S. negotiating positions during SALT or about various Soviet strategic programs. One merely wonders one doesn't know why.

The second observation involves current allegations that the incumbent Secretary of Defense has broken tradition and engaged in what are described as unusual, if not unprecedented activities, such as replying to charges made by political candidates about defense policy. I have not researched this matter closely and my memory is far from perfect, but I do seem to recall other Secretaries of Defense--in both Republican and Democratic Administrations--addressing party platform committees, correcting inaccurate allegations about defense matters, at times even using very strong language while replying.

It is not unusual for national security matters to become issues in a campaign. It is not unusual for challengers to make criticisms, and it is not unusual for incumbents to make replies.

Let us get diverted into partisan exchanges that obscure the real issues, let me offer my opinion that the most important question to be answered after the stealth dust settles is: in a democratic society, yet one which has real adversaries around the world, how do we protect our most vital secrets while not losing the freedoms which define our system and our way of life? The answers are not obvious or easy. They involve questions of policy, of law, of ethics, of freedom of the press, of justice. These are the matters to which this body must return.

Mr. Speaker, the overriding concern in the matter of the stealth program is whether the Soviets have benefitted from recent publicity of the program. A secondary, but nonetheless very important concern is whether the Carter Administration orchestrated leaks of classified information about the program for political gain--and thereby giving the Soviets a head start in countering stealth technology.

I don't know about the infrared signature of stealth aircraft, but I do know that, so far, this controversy has generated far more heat than light.

Let me try to shed some light on this matter, in part by putting it in a broader context and by laying out a fuller chronology of events. From much of the current controversy, even the moderately attentive observer would get the impression that the whole affair began with a meeting on August 18, 1980, between Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Benjamin Schemmer of the Armed Forces Journal. In fact, there is much more history to be reckoned with.

Virtually since the invention of radar, scientists have been working to develop ways to offset it--to blind radars, to fool radars, to make objects less detectable by radar. As in many areas of high technology, the United States has been in the vanguard of this work. The professional journals and the trade press have published articles about such research over the years.

Contrary to the impression recently left by former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger, the U.S. effort in this area was not highly classified until 1977. In the ~~spring~~^{fall} of that year, after recognizing the true potential of stealth, the Carter Administration turned it into a major development and production program; compartmentalized it, and classified even the existence of this new, intensified program. This is the first important landmark in the chronology of stealth.

The second is in June 1978, when Ben Schemmer of the Armed Forces Journal came to Dr. Perry with an article about stealth--an article 98 percent of which, Mr. Schemmer testified, came from unclassified sources, yet which contained so much sensitive information that Dr. Perry, invoking our national security interest, asked Mr. Schemmer not to print it. To his credit, Mr. Schemmer agreed--but let me emphasize that Mr. Schemmer did not initiate the notion of restraint; Dr. Perry did.

And the secret held for over two years, despite a dramatic expansion of the scope and size of the program, and therefore the number of people who had to--and did--know about it.

The third landmark is a series of stories this summer, beginning with a June 28 Washington Post article describing a new bomber that "could be made invisible to enemy radar through highly secret gadgetry."

Then in the second week of August, three stories in rapid succession:

-- August 11 -- Aviation Week and Space Technology refers to "the advanced technology 'stealth' bomber." Two sentences in the article are worth highlighting in our search for who leaked what to whom and when:

"Several in the Senate contend Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William J. Perry oversold the 'stealth' aircraft in order to stop a Senate amendment for a new but more conventional bomber. Perry's stealth bomber, one senator complained, is too small, will cost \$14-15 billion for 50 aircraft and cannot be ready by 1987, the date requested by Congress."

-- August 14 -- the Washington Post publishes the article that Gen Ellis of SAC has said "brought the

The key point is that, while there had been occasional public references to such work over the years, the summer of 1980 brought a rapid-fire series of such stories--this at a time when more and more people--members of the House and Senate, their staffs, Defense Department and other executive branch officials, and contractors--were being brought in on the Stealth program as it continued to grow in size and intensity and cost.

As members of this House know well, there is a world of difference between rare and scattered references to an issue and a flurry of stories about one.

After this flurry of articles, a period of intense activity began at the Pentagon--and, again, the chronology is important.

-- August 14 -- the date of the last two stories - Dr. Perry sends Secretary Brown new security guidelines for stealth, declassifying the existence of the program, but drawing a tight circle around sensitive technical and operational details.

-- August 16 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry, and Air Force Secretary Mark meet and give final approval to the new guidelines,

order additional Congressional briefings, and decide on an August 22 press conference to announce the existence of the stealth program.

-- August 18 -- With Brown's approval, Perry meets with Schemmer, tells him of the August 22 press conference and indicates what has been declassified. Perry offers to let Schemmer print the story of what has been declassified, one day in advance of the press conference--because Schemmer has honored Perry's 1978 request to hold AFJ's earlier stealth story.

-- August 19 -- Schemmer shows Perry his new article, and--at Perry's request--agrees to delete about a dozen items, several of which Perry felt were particularly important from a security point of view.

-- August 20 -- Perry gives SECRET stealth briefings to four Congressional committees, specifying what has been declassified and what remains classified at SECRET level, and

states that all other stealth information remains compartmented at the highest security level.

-- August 21 -- Schemmer article appears.

-- August 22 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry, and Gen Kelly Burke hold a press conference. They confirm: 1.) that a stealth program exists, 2.) that tests have been conducted, 3.) that stealth does not involve a single technical approach, and 4.) that stealth technology could be applied to many military vehicles. Following the new guidelines, they emphasize that operational and technical details will be protected at the highest security level.

Now, Mr. Speaker, we come back to the key question--did the Soviets benefit from DoD's public acknowledgement of stealth's existence?

The answer, I believe, clearly is no. You don't have to be a Washington veteran or an intelligence expert to know that the Soviets read Aviation Week, Aerospace Daily, the Washington Post, and other important journals and newspapers. They watch American

television news as well. So, they had seen, over the years, a number of reports in respected and authoritative publications about a U.S. program that had real consequences for Soviet defense. Well before Brown's August 22 press conference, Soviet scientists and engineers--and, no doubt, Soviet intelligence agents--were hard at work on stealth and possible countermeasures.

They weren't tipped off by Harold Brown on August 22, or by the Schemmer article on August 21. And nothing Harold Brown could have said on August 22 could have turned them off. Given the public reports over the years, and given the importance of U.S. stealth capabilities to the Soviets, does anyone seriously believe that, had Harold Brown said "no comment," "neither confirm nor deny," or "stories about Stealth are a bunch of baloney," the Kremlin would have breathed a sigh of relief and told the scientists, engineers, and KGB agents working on stealth to go back to other projects?

The second question, Mr. Speaker, is whether the Carter Administration orchestrated stealth leaks for political gain? Unlike Mr. Schemmer in his sworn testimony before a Committee of this House, I will not engage in speculation about other people's motives.

As to leaks this summer, Aviation Week cites "several in the Senate," not administration sources. The Washington Post says its June 28 article was based on interviews "with defense specialists

in Congress and the Carter Administration." It does not say only with DoD officials.

As for the Armed Forces Journal, in 1978 it was Schemmer who came to Perry with the story--not the other way around. It was Perry who asked Schemmer not to go public--not the other way around. In August of this year, Perry--who as a contractor and as a defense official has been working with classified material for years--says he gave Schemmer no classified information in 1978 or in 1980. Schemmer, whose publication regularly--one is tempted to say routinely--prints classified information, says his sources for the 1978 article included people in Congress, in the White House, and at the Pentagon. Contrary to what some may believe, the Armed Forces Journal was not a virgin as far as classified information is concerned.

In conclusion, let me summarize: Secretary Brown's August 22 press conference did not tip off the Soviets. Earlier press accounts had. In August 1980, no other response could have turned the Soviets off.

Until three years ago, the existence of Stealth was not classified. For the past three years it has been, even to the point that you yourself, Mr. Speaker, have indicated you were not aware of it.

An investigation is underway to find the source of the earlier leaks. A tight security circle has been drawn around operational and technical details of the program.

The August 21 Schemmer article was not the excuse or the occasion or the trigger for the August 22 press conference. Earlier press reports led to that course.

Who leaked what to whom, when, how, and why is a matter for the investigators. As testimony before a Committee of this House has revealed, there are real and serious problems in maintaining security and investigating breaches of it. By and large, these problems are not a function of executive policy, but rather a function of the law. Legislation is written in this building, not in the Pentagon. And it is to legislation regarding secrecy and security that those of us in this building should turn our attention. There is much important and difficult work to be done, and I say full speed ahead.

MILITARY MANPOWER/REGISTRATION/DRAFT

Reagan

Reagan opposes both the President's move to reinstate draft registration and any peacetime draft.

"I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration."

Acceptance Speech
July 17, 1980

He also challenges the underlying premise for registration.

"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our military preparedness, by making people think we have solved our defense problem..."

Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980

Asked for an alternative to the peacetime draft, Reagan calls for a buildup of reserves. (It is not clear if he favors the same buildup as an alternative to registration.)

"There is a need for a million-man active reserve, a reserve that is equipped with the latest weapons, trained in them and combat ready. We've allowed (our reserve force) to deteriorate very badly. It is must too small, it is not equipped with the latest weapons and it doesn't have the training."

National Journal
March 8, 1980

To finance this force, Reagan would rely on pay incentives.

Q: So you believe we can have a million-man reserve strictly on a volunteer basis?

Reagan: yes.

Q: How, with pay incentives?

Reagan: Yes, it could be pay incentives.

National Journal
March 8, 1980

Bush

"I also support draft registration for both men and women, and I would like to see an immediate investigation of the readiness of our military troops. If the facts demand it, we should not hesitate to increase financial incentives for those in uniform or even to return to the draft. I am confident that our young people will rally to the flag as the need is there."

Bush

"I think that we have to have draft registration....I don't know whether we need a draft now. But when we do need it, I'm going to say so. A fair draft with not a lot of exemptions that would prevent people from serving, letting rich kids to ahead and get a Phd, while some poor ghetto kid gives his life in the service of his country....It'll be men and women. That doesn't mean that women will fight, go on the line or in the trenches. But I believe in women's rights and opportunities and I believe that women should have to serve their country."

Birmingham, Al, Post-Her
October 5, 1979

Bush

"It would be an equitable draft if we need it. It would be a non-sexist draft if we need it....But that main thing is that it would be a fair draft."

Champaign, IL, Daily Ill
January 31, 1980

Bush

"I favor registration....I'm not convinced we need the draft, but if we ever should, it ought to be men and women, exemption proof and with a limited period of exposure."

Political Profiles
page 6
1979

Bush

"I voted for the volunteer Army. (But) we might have to go to a draft, and if we do it's going to be a fair-play draft. Not any exemption for a rich kid to get his PhD, and the poor kid gets the rifle."

Christian Science Monito
January 24, 1980

Carter

"At home, over intense opposition, as you know, but with great help from the American Legion, we have won the fight for peacetime draft registration. We need the ability to mobilize quickly and effectively, and we have shown our resolve to both friend and foe alike.

It should be clear to everyone who studies national security or defense that our work to keep American the strongest nation in the world is not finished. There are no laurels on which to rest. There are no victories which are final. There are no challenges which have disappeared magically. But we've resumed a firm and steady course of diplomacy and defense preparedness to lead our allies and our friends and ourselves with confidence toward the challenges facing the world of today and the world of tomorrow. "

Address to American Legion
Convention
August, 1980

Defense Manpower--Overview

President Carter has been explicit in his opposition to a peacetime draft; he has submitted legislation for a fair benefits package to improve military pay and benefits; he has cut military attrition, and (measured against the years of the prior administration) improved military reenlistment rates. In addition he has corrected major weaknesses that arose during the prior administration with respect to our pool of mobilization manpower.

Specifically:

- First term attrition (the drop-out rate of those who sign up for military service but do not complete their terms) has fallen from 37% in 1976 to 30% in 1978.

- Conversely, reenlistment rates for DoD as a whole are up from 50% in 1976 to 53% now. (The reenlistment rates of first termers are up, particularly in the Army. Career reenlistment rates are down. The net effect is a modest plus.)

- As a general matter DoD has been within 1.5% of its active force manpower pools in every Carter year--a better record than in the prior two administrations.

- Virtually all of the particular items recommended by critics of this Administration's military pay and benefits policy (right down to the nitty gritty item of increasing the allowance for mobile homes) were first publicly recommended by this Administration.

- Beyond that, the Administration has been vocal in support of many important benefits that go beyond those endorsed by its critics. Among these are improvements in the military medical insurance program (CHAMPUS) under which the President has proposed the creation of dental and other benefits. The Administration also supports a variable housing allowance. It introduced--and supports--legislation that would permit larger pay raises for the military than for civilian government employees.

This Administration has not proposed reducing any in-service benefits,* and, as noted, has proposed numerous additions. An Administration proposal with respect to

* Note, it may be argued that the President's paid parking operation is such a diminution, but it more or less incidentally affects only a small fraction of military personnel.

military retirement (first advanced by an independent commission on the subject: would add \$7 billion to military pay and benefits over the next 20 years, while saving tens of billions of dollars over the longer term.

- It should be noted that selected reserves (i.e., reserves in units) strength declined dramatically every year during the last administration, while it has increased during the last two Carter years; that individual reserve strength declined even more dramatically during the last administration, but has been reversed by Carter programs; and that in reinstituting peacetime registration this Administration has restored an important standby mobilization capacity that the previous administration had abandoned for budgetary reasons.

Defense Manpower Policies

The 1970's: Requirements

As the 1970's ended, the U.S. fielded its leanest active and reserve armed force since the 1950's: slightly over two million active duty members; a little over one million reservists (attached table 1). This leanness resulted from a number of things, but it was in no small measure the product of some important doctrinal changes concerning force structure that were made in the first half of the seventies. Four of these are noteworthy.

- Worldwide manpower requirements were adjusted downward by President Nixon, from a program objective to be prepared for 2 1/2 wars simultaneously to a less demanding scenario that envisaged a major European war and a smaller contingency elsewhere.

- At the same time, a concept of global "total force planning" was embraced, which placed greater reliance than in the past on the armed forces of allies and regional powers to supply initial forces and the first line of defense for many warfare possibilities.

- Within U.S. manpower assets, in 1973 a concept of "total force planning" was also adopted, one which placed less heavy reliance on the active forces and much more on the activation and emergency mobilization of reserves, and which worked some shifts of wartime functions and assets from the active to the reserve structure; and

- The all-volunteer (or "zero" draft) force replaced the partial conscript manning scheme that had existed from 1948 to 1972.

Two other factors were at work in the early seventies as well: the Vietnam conflict ended, and with it came a drawdown of the strength increases that had begun in 1964; and the increasing sophistication of modern weaponry, plus the need for forward deployments and rapid responses (made vivid in the 1973 Yom Kippur War) were inexorably forcing shifts to smaller but more experienced forces that had been the case in the first two post-war decades.

For the remainder of the decade, defense manpower strategy consisted of:

* In part for budgetary reasons, in part to reflect the changing role of China in U.S. strategic concerns about Asia and the Pacific.

-- To be augmented in the first instance in an emergency by a call-up of reserves;

-- To be augmented additionally by call-ups of pretrained individuals subject to call-up and by a resumption of conscription in the context of a mobilization.

The Administration refined, but did not make fundamental changes, in these manpower policies.

The 1970's: Resources

The Defense manning performance in the remainder of the decade was mixed. Despite some periodic shortfalls in enlistments, the active forces were generally successful in meeting recruiting goals (Table 2); and since 1974, had never been more than one-and-one-half percent below authorized strength (Table 3). First term reenlistments remained strong. At the same time, reserve strengths lagged notably behind the active forces (Table 2), and the Services experienced a significant--almost chronic--slippage in retention of more experienced enlisted members. (The problem is particularly serious in the Navy, where second term reenlistment rates have fallen 15 points over the last five years.)

This mixed yield took place in a context that circumstantially favored military manning needs in a couple of ways, but which otherwise was not very sustaining. The Services benefitted for most of the decade from two things in combination.

- The demographics--the baby boom legacy-- worked to our advantage. By the time it peaked in 1978, the prime recruiting pool (males, 17-21) topped ten million.

- We met a smaller manpower requirement in the post-Vietnam seventies than we had at any time since 1950.

But other factors were not favorable, and more than offset these cushions.

- The relative value of military compensation eroded notably beginning in 1973;

- There was a similar erosion in the uniqueness of the advantages that military service had long offered youth. No longer was the military the major source of initial jobs and training, nor the principal stepping stone to higher education. A bounty of federal programs in place by mid-decade (basic educational opportunity grants, CETA, the Job Corps, Young Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Opportunity Acts, and various counter-cyclical programs) now compete for young people.

- The G.I. Bill was replaced in 1977 by an educational package for service personnel that is seen by many young people as much less attractive (and, as a matter of benefits, is in fact less attractive);

- The U.S. embraced all-volunteer manning with a compensation and incentive structure that is long on tradition but short on flexibility. The military retirement system (which the Administration studied and has proposed sweeping changes in) is a notable example--a structure built on perverse incentives, such that a person has little inducement to stay after 20 years, and no incentives to say for less. We have no rewards to offer the youth who would give 10 or 15, but not 20, years of service to country.

In embracing the AVF in 1973, the nation's policy changed faster than its structures; its philosophy outpaced its budgets and programs in some key respects.

Administration Policy

There are two cornerstones:

- In the absence of an exigent international circumstance, the nation's military manpower requirements are best met on an all-volunteer basis. Current military manning problems seem most capable of solution in an AVF context. A return to a peacetime draft is neither necessary nor desirable at this time. So long as our recruiting needs continue to be met, and so long as the demands on the armed forces can be met with present force levels, a return to the draft is neither prudent nor required.

- The nation's ability to augment its forces in an emergency had eroded in mid-decade, however, and requires a reinvigoration. The reinstitution this summer of peacetime registration has been taken as a precautionary step to save crucial time in the event the nation had to mobilize in an emergency. (It was always intended that the AVF be augmented by conscription in such emergency circumstances.)

With the baby boom legacy receding (the prime recruiting pool in 1992 will be 20 percent smaller than its 1978 level) and with tougher competition for recruits, DoD has embraced two general strategies.

- First, we can reduce demand by managing the force in ways that permit us to need fewer recruits from the marketplace. DoD is already firmly embarked on such a course in three respects: reversing the trend of the 1970's toward high attrition (i.e., wash-outs) of first term personnel, pruning manpower requirements in weapons systems acquisition and design, and improving our long term retention of those who do join up.

• Second, we can expand supply, by embracing policies that would make more people eligible for military service, and would make service more attractive to those who are eligible. DoD is doing the first of these by increasing the enlistment of women for non-combat positions. It is also studying whether some of its physical entrance standards--many of these adopted in the draft era when supply was virtually unlimited--bear a sound relationship to required performance. The yield from this measure will be finite, however, to do the second--increase the attractiveness of service--will require some hard decisions. There has been a serious downward slide in the comparative value of military pay and benefits for junior personnel. Other federal programs that require no service obligations offer highly valued lures to youth. In educational assistance, we now have the G.I. Bill without the G.I.

We have made considerable headway, but certainly not enough, in both strategies since 1977. And there is nothing to suggest that the strategies themselves are not inherently appropriate.

Are the Services enlisting the "right kinds of people?" "The right quality?" The short answer is that there is no sure test to tell. True military readiness is difficult to measure and appraise; on-job performance can be graded, but its relationship to the testable characteristics of candidates for service remains a vague and imperfectly documented one.

Historically, the caliber of incoming recruits has been described using two surrogate measures: graduation from high school and entrance test scores.

By the first of these, high school graduation--a good predictor of a candidate's staying power and adaptability to discipline but not of his on-job performance--the Services have experienced a decline since mid-decade. At the same time, however, the staying power of both graduates and non-graduates (measured by attrition rates) has been improved in recent years, largely through better management of recruits after they join.

As for the second, we have recently found that in entrance tests--used to predict "trainability"--we have inadvertently inflated the scores of lower-scoring personnel in recent years, such that the Services have been mislabeling large numbers of recruits as having higher "aptitude" levels. The significance of these mischaracterizations may not, however, be very profound. DoD has now undertaken a special analysis of the relationship between these scores and the job performance of those whose scores were inflated. The first (but still tentative) findings suggest that most of the low scoring people have successfully completed training and are performing adequately.

The relationship of these predictors to "quality"--and the relationship of what a recruit brings to the military and what military service itself produces in the way of eventual "quality"--are imprecise, at best approximate, ultimate unsure. Neither the AVF's critics nor its supporters have an indisputable formula for measuring such things.

DEFENSE FORCE READINESSSS

Bush

"I am clearly in favor and continue to be of a three-ocean Navy, and that means we should commence work on a nuclear carrier. The first year of this, a lot of this spending, this extra spending would be to catch up in conventional types of categories where we've gotten behind, and inventory. We've gotten behind in maintenance. We've gotten behind in a lot of just plain replacing of obsolete items."

Wall Street Journal
February 19, 1980

Mondale

"It is not wrong to ask whether we are strong enough to provide for this nation's defenses: that is how we keep the peace. But it is utterly wrong to assume we are behind. The truth is that today there is no American General or Admiral who would propose to trade our defense forces with those of any other nation--now, or in the foreseeable future."

Commonwealth Club
Address, September 5, 19

Carter

"Yes. The answer is yes. I don't want to go into detail now because the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense today are answering an article that was published in the New York Times this morning on the front page saying that some of our Army divisions were not prepared for combat, did not enjoy combat readiness."

"We've added, including a bill I signed yesterday to increase the pay and benefits of military personnel, we've added about \$4 billion since I've been in office to improve the quality of military persons, to improve the retention rate among vital trained petty officers primarily and also to help with recruitment."

"We've had remarkable success that we did not anticipate really with the registration for the draft with about 93 percent of the young people who were eligible registering for the draft. About 15 percent of those who registered expressed a desire to know more about career opportunities in the military forces. There was a place on the form that they could check there, which I think will help us with recruitment in the future."

"The spirit within the military is very good. They've had some onerous assignments that I've given them, for instance, the longterm stationing of aircraft carriers and the support ships in the north Indian Ocean. They've performed superbly in that respect. I visited a lot of the military bases. I happen to be a professional military man by training and I've found them to be well trained. so I would guess that our military forces are in good condition."

New Jersey Editors Week 1
September 9, 1980

STATUS OF U.S. DIVISIONS

The New York Times article of September 9 on Army readiness was factual and accurate, but fell short of a reasonable explanation of the situation. Forward deployed divisions, the combat force of that 45% of the Army which is overseas, are maintained at highest status.

State-side divisions have the mission to deploy overseas where needed, to reinforce forward deployed units, or to go to areas where required. The status of state-side divisions is forecast to improve significantly over the next several months for several reasons:

- Recruiting for the past year has fully met objections and those soldiers are now beginning to arrive in units
- NCO shortages will be improved, as the Chief of Staff of the Army announced the other day, as balancing of forces by reduction of overstrengths in forward deployed forces takes effect.

These actions take about six months to work, and we can expect to see reasonable improvements in the status of state-side units within the next six months.

The situation is not as dreary as it might appear on the surface.

The Army's Units Status Report classifies divisions as "fully ready" to "not ready" according to personnel, equipment, and training conditions. A division rated low is one of these resource areas is capable of operating with two of its three brigades if required to deploy immediately. In addition, assets could be quickly shifted from one division to improve the readiness of another division. Even though personnel challenges prevail, the Army could cross level resources in the United States to respond to a crisis. This would provide earlier deploying force full combat capability. In any event, the Unit Status Report is an indicator of a division's resource picture and the time required to bring it to full capability -- excellent for flagging divisions rather than a measure of combat readiness.

It is common practice among all armed forces to man units in peacetime at lower levels than would be required in wartime.

It is also important to recognize that the Soviets keep the majority of their divisions at less than full combat readiness.

Force Readiness

a. Aircraft Readiness (including spares parts)

- Over the past several years the Defense budget has generally provided enough spare parts to support the peacetime flying hour program fully. However, we are continuing to build war reserve inventories of spare parts and it will be several years before those inventories will be adequate to support all of our combat air forces at wartime sortie rates in a major conflict for the full combat durations for which we plan.

- The claim that our hardware and spares posture is such that "only half the planes can fly" is inaccurate. This assertion seems to be based on a misinterpretation of the so-called aircraft "mission-capable (MC)" rate. MC rates are not a measure of wartime readiness. They are an index of the peacetime performance of our logistics support system--not a measure of our ability to fly sorties in wartime.

- We should not expect MC rates to even approach 100%, for two reasons--first, even under the best of conditions, significant maintenance downtime (much of it scheduled preventative maintenance and inspections) must be expected as an unavoidable cost of doing business; second, we cannot predict with certainty which aircraft components will fail when, where, or how often. It is not practical or wise to buy enough spare components to protect completely against the uncertainty involved, and we typically stock to about 85% spares availability.

- If we were to make a transition to war from our normal day-to-day peacetime posture, we would selectively defer nonurgent periodic inspections and preventive maintenance; we would also, of course, have unlimited access to our war reserve spares and would, as necessary, cannibalize serviceable components from out-of-commission aircraft to maximize our wartime sortie capability.

b. Navy Ship Aviation/Readiness

- Today, the Navy's inventory of active deployable ships stands at 455. One hundred two of our ships are deployed. Two hundred eighty-nine (64%) are reporting combat ready. 85 ships are in programmed maintenance, a category which includes overhaul, selected restricted availability, and post shakedown availability. Seventeen ships are not combat ready* because of elective maintenance

* "Not Combat Ready" means that the unit has insufficient resources to meet warfighting demands in a projected combat environment. However, units being deployed in this category can execute planned operations in a peacetime environment.

(this is work that is done during scheduled upkeep periods), and fifteen others are in a corrective maintenance category, having sustained casualties to combat essential equipment. The remaining 49 are deficient principally in areas of personnel, training and supply.

- Of 157 deployable active Navy squadrons, 36 report their primary degraded area as personnel and 15 report not combat ready for the remaining resource areas.

- Recognizing the inevitability under existing requirements that units reporting not combat ready may be required to forward deploy, the Navy has recently initiated an assessment procedure which is required thirty days prior to deployment for all units reporting not combat ready in personnel. This assessment either offers a final opportunity for improvement measures or furnishes the basis for operational limitations in the interests of safety. In the past the Navy has augmented ships with personnel from other duty stations to meet critical skill shortages. The fleet commanders administer this level manning policy in order to spread manpower shortages throughout the fleet. Use of this practice has been infrequent. However, there will probably be some necessary increases in this practice for ships on station in the Indian Ocean.

c. Divisions

- Our forward deployed Army divisions are well-equipped, well-trained, and at a high state of readiness. Within the United States, the 82nd Airborne Division is maintained at a high state of readiness. Many of the remaining divisions in the United States have serious personnel problems, primarily due to shortages of combat arms NCOs.

- We are taking numerous steps to improve our division readiness by alleviating personnel shortages. In recruiting, we are expanding bonus programs that are keyed toward critical skills. We are also supporting legislation now in Congress to improve educational benefits, including provisions that would pass on unused educational benefits to dependents. To alleviate the shortage of middle-grade NCOs, we are working to expand bonus programs to include mid-range NCOs (6-10 years' service) in infantry, armor, field artillery, and other selected skills.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF LEADERSHIP

Bush

"The Carter Administration, despite its sudden recognition of the American people's concern over our nation's ability to defend itself, has shown no understanding of the lessons of modern history."

"Under a Reagan presidency, however, the reversal of those ominous trends will serve as a keystone of a foreign policy based on just such an understanding: a foreign policy that proceeds from strength--not simply military strength, but the strength of our alliances--and the reinforcement of those alliances by America's being true to its word in our dealings with other nations."

World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh, September 5,

Bush

"We don't have the luxury of dealing with one problem while the others languish...They are interrelated, and so must our handling of them be."

"The message will be loud and clear around the world: The United States means to maintain her security and to retain the ability to stand by her friends."

Boston Globe
September 8, 1979

Mondale

"We will also stake the contest on the paramount issue the Republicans tried to raise in Detroit--the question of national strength. We gladly accept that challenge."

"The President of the United States has an enormous job. He's charged with the most powerful responsibility to be found in the world--the burden of nuclear power. He is the leader of the civilized world. He must defend its freedom. He must grasp the complexities of our difficult world. He must protect our security by freeing our dependence on foreign oil."

"And to do all of that, we must have a strong President. Yet last month Ronald Reagan spent two days on national television drawing up a plan to divide the Presidency and weaken its powers. Anyone who seeks the Presidency--and in his first serious act convenes a Constitutional Convention in his hotel room to weaken the office he's seeking--does not understand the Constitution, the Presidency, or what national security is all about."

D.N.C. Acceptance Speech
August 1980

NAVAL BALANCE VIS-a-VIS USSR

Reagan

Reagan has criticized the Carter Administration for slashing Navy programs.

"In 1969, Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations, told Congress that a Navy of 850 ships should be attained by 1980. By the end of this fiscal year only 5 or 6 weeks away, our conventional Navy will consist of only 415 active ships. Carter has slashed the Navy shipbuilding program in half, and has provided for -- at the very best -- a one-and-a-half ocean Navy for a three-ocean global requirement."

Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980

Reagan calls for a reversal in this trend.

"We must immediately reverse the deterioration of our naval strength, and provide all of the armed services with the equipment and spare parts they need."

Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980

The Republican Platform calls for building more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships:

"Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by President Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships. We will restore naval and Marines aircraft procurement to economical rates enabling rapid modernization of the current forces, and expansion to meet the requirements of additional carriers.

1980 Republican Platform

Bush

"A stronger Navy for us, a three-ocean Navy, is essential."

Political Profiles
page 9
1979

Carter

Naval Forces

"Seapower is indispensable to our global position--in peace and also in war. OUR shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat.

"The program I have proposed will assure the ability of our Navy to operate in the high threat areas, to maintain control of the seas and protect vital lines of communication--both military and economic--and to provide the strong maritime component of our rapid deployment forces. This is essential for operations in remote areas of the world, where we can not predict far in advance the precise location of trouble, or preposition equipment on land."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"It has been said that our Navy is inferior to the Soviet Navy, because they have more ships. But the number of ships alone is a false measure. It assumes that one of their coastal patrol ships is the equal of one of our aircraft carriers, and that one of their diesels is as capable as one of our modern Trident nuclear submarines. The truth is that the technology of our carriers, of our submarines, and our new surface ships is far more advanced than theirs. Moreover, from frigates on up, we have a two-to-one advantage over the Soviets in Surface combat tonnage. All of these factors must be weighed for any serious and realistic assessment of the strength of our Navy -- a strength that is unsurpassed on the high seas.

Commonwealth Club
September 5, 1980

Naval Balance Vis-a-Vis Soviet Union

- The CNO stated earlier this year that the U.S. Navy is the best in the world and has improved in capability relative to a year ago. The Navy believes that, in conjunction with our allies, we currently possess a slim margin of superiority over the maritime forces of the Soviets.

- Current estimates indicate that the Soviets are continuing to emphasize qualitative improvements and that the trend toward construction of larger surface combatants and auxiliaries will result in a moderate decrease in overall Soviet Navy force levels over the next decade. For example, the total of Soviet principal surface combatants (carriers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates) and general purpose submarines is projected to decline by 5-10% over the next decade.

- Conversely, our naval forces are projected to grow from current levels (about 540 total ships) to about 590 ships by the mid-1980s and remain at this level through the late 1980s, based on Navy force projections that reflect a shipbuilding program generally consistent with the 5-year plan submitted to Congress last January (roughly 19-20 new construction ships per year). Projections beyond the late 1980s are more difficult to make due to the uncertainties associated with future shipbuilding plans, ship designs and costs, and the retirement schedules of existing ships. Furthermore, our threat projections become increasingly uncertain beyond the late 1980s thus making detailed capability assessments extremely speculative.

- In addition to the projected growth in the number of ships in our Navy -- in terms of both major combatants and support ships -- our naval force structure will undergo major qualitative improvements through the 1980s. Such qualitative improvements are not reflected in numbers comparisons but are taken into account in capability assessments. Some examples:

- Our 12 deployable carrier battle groups will be maintained and strengthened by the addition of two CVNs, AAW improvements with new CG-47 Aegis cruisers and upgrades to other guided missile ships, and ASW improvements such as towed tactical array sonars and new LAMPS MK III ASW helicopters. 12 deployable aircraft carrier battle groups represent the minimum offensive capability required to meet peacetime needs and wartime demands in the face of Soviet opposition.

- We will continue to modernize and increase the size of our nuclear attack submarine force with both continued SSN-688 procurement and introduction of a more affordable yet fully adequate follow-on submarine (FA-SSN).

- Our overall ASW capabilities will be further strengthened by continued modernization of our highly effective land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft forces. Substantial improvements will also be made in our undersea surveillance capabilities with improved SOSUS and introduction of at least 12 SURTASS mobile surveillance systems (TAGOS ships).

Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan

The current five-year shipbuilding plan proposes to build 97 new ships and modernize 5 older ships. This shipbuilding plan incorporates both a shift toward the high end of the mix of combatant ships, and the construction of new maritime prepositioning ships (MPS/TAKX) to support the rapid deployment force.

The five-year shipbuilding program was derived on the basis of the Navy being prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of our national interests. Using information from the Navy's study program, we have reviewed carefully over the past year the roles that can be played by the Navy in a NATO war, non-NATO contingencies, intervention and crisis control, and in promoting strategic deterrence and world wide stability.

The first priority of our naval forces in a NATO war is to ensure the timely delivery of military shipping to Europe with acceptably low losses. Intervention and crisis control, where the chance of direct U.S./USSR conflict is small, generate a need for offensive operations by our carrier and amphibious forces. We are continuing to explore the implications of basing naval forces program planning on forward deployments and intervention outside NATO, rather than exclusively planning scenarios that emphasize the Navy as primarily a sea control force designed to secure the North Atlantic sea lines of communication against Soviet submarines and long range bombers in a NATO war.

It has been estimated that to maintain the fleet at its present level of about 533 ships (active force, naval reserve force, and naval fleet auxiliary force) will require an average of about \$7B (FY 81 \$) in the shipbuilding account annually. The program that is proposed provides for an 11% average real growth over the five-year period. In a war with the Soviets and with the help of our allies, this force would be capable of performing sea control operations in the Atlantic; sea control and projection operations in the Mediterranean; and austere sea control operations in the Pacific.

We need not only realistic estimates of force levels and capability, but also stability in the shipbuilding program to provide a firm industrial base.

The shipbuilding plan supports the Navy's requirements for strategic deterrence and forces to fight a NATO war by:

- Enhancing the capability of our strategic forces by adding 6 Trident submarines.

September 4, 1980

NAVAL POSTURE IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOVIET CARRIER MINSK

Q: What is our naval posture in the Indian Ocean region?

A: We have maintained a strengthened presence in the Indian Ocean since late last year and we have made arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of Northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

— The size of our permanent presence in the region, the Middle East Force, was increased to five ships last fall. We currently have 36 ships in the Indian Ocean including two carrier task groups, headed by the carriers DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER and MIDWAY. The 36 ships include 21 combatants and 15 support ships (including the 7 maritime near term prepositioning ships).

--The Soviets currently have 27 ships in the Indian Ocean including 11 combatants and 16 support ships.

--The 40,000 ton Soviet carrier MINSK departed the Vladivostok area last week and is currently operating in the South China Sea (4 Sept). So far, its movements have not indicated a move toward the Indian Ocean.

FYI ONLY: MINSK arrived at Vladivostok on July 3, 1979, after earlier sailing from the Mediterranean, around Africa and across the Indian Ocean. Until MINSK's move last week, the ship had remained at or near Vladivostok.

Source: President's State of the Union address
DoD Press Guidance
CINCPAC

NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Bush

"Suddenly, after long years of administration silence on the subject, the White House, with the help of the defense secretary, is busy orchestrating a massive public relations program to bolster President Carter's image as a Commander-in-Chief who recognizes the Soviet military threat.

"Suddenly, we hear of a presidential directive--PD 59--which we're told restructures American nuclear strategy in light of a fresh look at Soviet objectives."

World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh
September 5, 1980

Carter

"Recently, there's been a great deal of press and public attention paid to a Presidential directive that I have issued, known as PD-59. As a new President charged with great responsibilities for the defense of this Nation, I decided that our Nation must have flexibility in responding to a possible nuclear attack --in responding to a possible nuclear attack. Beginning very early in my term, working with the Secretaries of State and Defense and with my own national security advisers we have been evolving such an improved capability. It's been recently revealed to the public in outline form by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. It's a carefully considered, logical, and evolutionary improvement in our Nation's defense capability and will contribute to the prevention of a nuclear conflict.

"No potential enemy of the United States should anticipate for one moment a successful use of military power against our vital interest. This decision will make that prohibition and that cautionary message even more clear. In order to ensure that no adversary is even tempted, however, we must have a range of responses to potential threats or crises and an integrated plan for their use."

American Legion Address
August 21, 1980

NATO ALLIES

Reagan

Reagan's primary concern is that if the United States does not appear a strong and dependable ally, the nations of Europe will seek an accomodation with the USSR.

"I think there is every indication that some of our European friends are beginning to wonder if they shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochement with-- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are dependable or not."

Time
June 30, 1980

To prevent such action, Reagan proposes to consult with the allies and reassure them of our interest in preserving the alliance.

"I think the Reagan Administration, first of all, would do it by action, by consulting with them, making it evident to them that we do value that alliance and want to preserve it."

Time
June 30, 1980

Reagan has stated he would not be adverse to intervening in the affairs of our NATO allies, however.

"To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted 'in any way to prevent or discourage' the Communists, adding 'It was clearly interest to do so.' But he refused to be more specific."

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Reagan has also suggested that the United States push for an extension of NATO's defensive perimeter into the Middle East.

"There would be nothing wrong with us...appealing to our NATO allies and saying, 'Look, fellows, let's just make this an extension of the NATO Line and you contribute some forces in here too.'"

National Journal
March 8, 1980

Carter

"At the outset of this Administration I emphasized the primacy of our Atlantic relationship in this country's national security agenda. We have made important progress toward making the Atlantic Alliance still more effective in a changing security environment.

"We are meeting the Soviet challenge in a number of important ways:

"First, there is a recognition among our allies that mutual security is a responsibility to be shared by all. We are each committed to increase national defense expenditures by 3% per year. There remains much work to be done in strengthening NATO's conventional defense; the work proceeding under the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program will help achieve this objective.

"Last month, we and our NATO allies took an historic step in Alliance security policies with the decision to improve substantially our theater nuclear capabilities. The theater nuclear force modernization (TNF) program, which includes the deployment of improved Pershing ballistic missiles and of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, received the unanimous support of our allies. The accelerated deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRVed missiles made this modernization step essential. TNF deployments will give the Alliance an important retaliatory option that will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot wage a nuclear war in Europe and expect that Soviet territory will remain unscathed."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"Mr. Secretary General, Members of the Council:

In behalf of President Carter, I have come today to NATO Headquarters as a matter of the first priority. I have come to convey to you and the member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- The President's most sincere greetings;
- His commitment--and the full commitment of the United States--to the North Atlantic Alliance as a vital part of our deep and enduring relations with Canada and Western Europe; and
- His dedication to improving cooperation and consultations with our oldest friends, so as to safeguard our peoples and to promote our common efforts and concerns.

The President's conviction concerning NATO's central role is deep-rooted and firm. As he stated in his message to the NATO ministers last month: "Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the partnership between North America and Western Europe. NATO is the essential instrument for enhancing our collective security. The American commitment to maintaining the NATO Alliance shall be sustained and strengthened under my administration."

Address to North Atlantic
Council
Brussel, Belgium
January 24, 1977

DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL

Reagan

Regardless of political affiliation, almost all public leaders support efforts aimed at reducing conflicts through negotiation. But Ronald Reagan has had doubts about negotiating peace.

"The President wants to end the cold war era of conflict and to substitute an era of negotiations, peaceful settlements of disputes before they flare into war. I am sure every American shares that goal. But are we also aware that every nation in history which has sought peace and freedom solely through negotiation has been crushed by conquerors bent on conquest and aggression."

Speech to World Affairs
Council
October 11, 1972

Mondale

"National strength requires more than just military might: It requires the commitment of the President to arms control.

"If there is one thing that bothers me more than anything else and I think bothers you, it is the fear that someday, somehow, for reasons that don't matter, the world will resort to the final madness of a nuclear holocaust. Reason, common sense, and a decent respect for humanity demand that we stall this nuclear arms race before it bankrupts and destroys us all.

"Without arms control, everything is out of control. Without the SALT treaty we would be forced to waste billions on weapons that buy us nothing.

"And even though it took seven years to negotiate this treaty; and even though our President, and our Secretary of Defense and all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every NATO ally wants this treaty ratified, Mr. Reagan for the life of him cannot understand why.

"Well, let me say Mr. Reagan: We must have arms control for the life of all of us, and we need a President Jimmy Carter who believes in controlling the madness of nuclear arms."

DNC Acceptance Speech
August 1980

NON-PROLIFERATION

Reagan

A Reagan Administration might not be concerned with pursuing a non-proliferation strategy:

"I just don't think it's (non-proliferation) any of our business."

Washington Post
January 31, 1980

Reagan clarified his assertion by adding:

"I think that all of us would like to see non-proliferation, but I don't think that any of us are succeeding in that. We are the only one in the world that's trying to stop it. The result is we have increased our problems would be eased if this government would allow the reprocessing of nuclear waste into plutonium..."

Monterey, Peninsula Herald
February 3, 1980

Mondale

"Our relationship with Western Europe and our NATO allies can be severely damaged by the defeat of this SALT II treaty. They strongly support it. They've been involved in it all the way. Their interests have been carefully taken into account. Around the world, as you know, there are several so-called threshold nations that are within a short distance of having their own nuclear weaponry. And we have been pleading with them, don't do it. Please don't resort to nuclear weaponry yourself. And the only basis for persuasion that we have is that, despite the fact that we are the holder of the most sophisticated pool of nuclear weaponry in the world we have handled that responsibly and with restraint, and therefore with moral authority we can ask them to refrain from resorting to their own nuclear weaponry.

"All of these things and more will be affected by the outcome of this agreement. I am convinced it is in our interest. I'm convinced it's in our national security interest. And I'm convinced that with the support of the American people, the ratification of this treaty will take the most important step that we can take together for our children. And that is to reduce the possibilities of the final madness, a nuclear war."

L.A. World Affairs Council
July 1979

Mondale

"Third, as we limit and reduce the weapons of existing nuclear states, we must work in concert to insure that no additional nuclear-weapon states emerge over the next decade and beyond.

"The spread of nuclear weapons to an ever-increasing number of countries and regions is a chilling prospect. It brings ever closer the probability of their use. Such proliferation would seriously heighten regional and global tensions. It would impede peaceful commerce in the field of nuclear energy. And it would make the achievement of nuclear disarmament vastly more difficult."

Address to the U.N.
Special Session of
Disarmament
May 1978

FOREIGN POLICY

Reagan

"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed with all this talk about our problems being too complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally of rationalizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy."

Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968

Reagan has chosen to ignore the progress that both Democratic and Republican administrations have made toward a secure peace.

His 1976 attacks on President Ford were at least as harsh as those he makes on President Carter in 1980. Throughout, he provides simple answers to the delicate complexities of foreign affairs -- answers which reflect his lack of understanding of the consequences of his remarks.

I. Military Involvement

Reagan frequently rejects a tempered response to international problems, preferring instead to flex America's military might at the slightest provocation. Over the last 12 years, Reagan has suggested or implied that American military forces be sent to Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Lebanon, the Middle East, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Rhodesia, Vietnam (after our troops had been sent home) and has hinted at retaking the Panama Canal.

Angola

In response to Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war Reagan said the U.S. should have told the Russians:

"Out. We'll let them (Angola) do the fighting or you're going to have to deal with us."

New York Times
January 6, 1976

Cuba

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan said:

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Cyprus

Reagan has said that, in a manner similiar to Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, as President he would have favored sending a "token (U.S.) military force" to Cyprus during the 1975 crisis on the island.

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Ecuador

In response to the Ecuadorians' seizure of U.S. tuna boats in 1975, Reagan suggested:

"(T)he U.S. government next winter should send along a destroyer with the tuna boats to cruise, say 13 miles off the shore of Ecuador in an updated version of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum to 'talk softly, but carry a big stick.'"

San Diego Union
Marcy 7, 1975

Lebanon

"In the same vein as Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, Reagan has said that, as President, he would have sent troops to Lebanon during the 1976 civil war."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Middle East

Responding to a question on whether the U.S. should establish a military presence in the Sinai to counter the Soviets, Reagan said:

"I think this might be a very, very good time for the United States to show a presence in the Middle East. I don't think it would be provocative and I don't think it looks like anyone bullying..."

Boston Globe
January 13, 1980

North Korea

In response to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, Reagan said:

"I cannot for the life of me understand why someone in the United States government, particularly the President, has not said, 'That ship had better come out of that harbor

in 24 hours or we are coming in after it."

Los Angeles Times
January 25, 1968

To demonstrate United States resolve and willingness to stand by defense treaties, Reagan said we should let it be known that, "B-52's should make a moonscape out of North Korea if South Korea is attacked."

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Pakistan

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan advocated sending advisers into Pakistan.

"I think the most logical thing is that they (the advisers) would go to the country we have a treaty with, Pakistan, and that training could be provided there, with U.S. and Pakistan where we have a legitimate reason and right to be."

St. Louis Globe-Democrat
January 11, 1980

Reagan also proposed sending "a squadron of planes" to Pakistan to counter the Soviets' move in Afghanistan.

Washington Star
January 31, 1980

Portugal

To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted "in any way to prevent or discourage" the Communists, adding "It was clearly in our interest to do so." But he refused to be more specific.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Rhodesia

To ensure an orderly transition in Rhodesia between a minority-white to a black-majority rule, Reagan said:

"Whether it will be enough to have simply a show of strength, a promise that we would (supply) troops or whether you'd have to go in with occupation forces or not I don't know."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

North Vietnam

The Los Angeles Times reported that in a speech to the National Headliners Club Reagan stated that the United States should have met North Vietnam's final thrust in South Vietnam with B-52 bombers.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Panama Canal

Reagan has long been a principal opponent of the Panama Canal Treaty, and has promised that:

"If there is any possibility of keeping the Panama Canal, believe me I would do it..."

Atlanta Constitution
January 18, 1980

United Nations

In the past, Reagan has found excuses to question United States' participation in the United Nations. The first occasion arose in 1971 when the issue of admitting China to the United Nations was being discussed.

"I was also disgusted and very frankly I think that it confirms the moral bankruptcy of that international organization...I don't know whether to withdraw totally from the adjuncts of the United Nations. You know the service organizations surrounding it are doing good work."

Press Conference
October 26, 1971

In 1975 when the United Nations condemned Zionism as racism, Reagan suggested, that if the U.N. continues its present conduct, the United States should serve notice "we're going to go home and sit a while."

Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1975

Reagan has also attacked various organs of the United Nations including UNESCO. In 1977 when the head of UNESCO, Sean MacBride, attacked the capitalist system, Reagan gave his reply.

"...UNESCO -- the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization...May actually be a base for communist espionage."

Jefferson City Missouri
Post
December 15, 1977

Foreign Aid

Reagan has attacked the foreign aid program.

"We've bought dress suits for Greek undertakers, extra wives for Kenya Government officials."

New York Times
January 23, 1965

Vietnam

Reagan has consistently defended the Vietnam war. In a recent speech before the Veteran's of Foreign Wars Convention, Reagan once again asserted the war was a "noble cause."

August 18, 1980

Reagan has also claimed that "The Vietnam war was not an action of moral poverty; it was a collective action of moral courage..."

Lafayette Journal
and Courier
April 23, 1980

Reagan feels that despite the best efforts of our soldiers to win the war, they were hamstrung by the politicians and some segments of the public.

"There is a lesson...in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail, or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace...we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to win."

Speech to Veterans
of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

In a 1967 Newsweek article, Reagan called upon President Johnson to escalate the Vietnam War using nuclear threats

"...no one would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons...But...the last person in the world who should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night being afraid that we might."

Los Angeles Times
July 3, 1967

Richard J. Whalen, one of Reagan's advisors, shares his outlook. He believes the United States should have bombed the dikes of North Vietnam, then "with 90% of the country under water" negotiated a peace.

Los Angeles Times
June 26, 1980

Bush

"Certainly there are going to be situations where an American President might have to contemplate the use of force. One of Carter's great problems is that nobody thinks under any circumstances that he would use force. It's the post-Vietnam syndrome. But, going back to Reagan, I do not favor blockading Cuba because I think that's irrelevant. You'd lose all support of moderates in this hemisphere on that."

National Journal
March 15, 1980

Bush

"I don't favor permanent bases (in the Middle East). That's where I differ with some of the other Republican candidates. And the reason I don't is not that I don't want to--don't recognize that you need at some point to project power or show force, but I see a permanent base in the Middle East as an invitation to the Soviets to do the one thing that the Sudanese and the Egyptians kept them from doing: getting a foothold in the Middle East again."

Bill Moyers' Journal
WNET/Thirteen
March 6, 1980

Bush

"I am convinced that Carter has been an abnormally weak and vacillating president in foreign affairs."

"He sees the world as he wishes it were, not as it is."

"We don't seem to be realistic enough, tough enough, strong enough. We have projected a failure to keep commitments, a weakness and vacillation."

Madison WI, State
Journal
November 8, 1979

Bush

"I don't believe in bullying one's allies. Or pushing some guy around because he's smaller. I believe in leading him and I know that at times, you have to say, 'This is how it's going to be.'"

Concord, NH,
Monitor & Patriot
October 12, 1979

Bush

Asked recently where he would draw the line and commit American troops, Bush said,

"Look, I'm not going to answer a hypothetical question about where you draw the line and put troops. That's one way to get into foreign policy trouble, and it's a sure way to get into political trouble."

Wall Street Journal
February 26, 1980
file #1-19-1 (R)

Bush

"I don't think you need an overall change in diplomacy, but I do think we need to be able to protect conventional force power selectively. I don't favor stationing of U.S. forces in the Middle East which, in my view, would draw Soviets back into the Middle East. But I don't think it's a question of redesigning something in the sense of a new machinery to deal with foreign policy, I think it's a projection of commitment and will."

New York Times
January 5, 1980

Bush

"Mine is a moderate approach. We don't need radical solutions. We need to figure out what works and what doesn't work. We need to find a balance."

Philadelphia, PA
Inquirer
October 22, 1979
file # 2-3-7

Carter

"There are two obvious preconditions for an effective American foreign policy: a strong national economy and a strong national defense.

"That's why I placed the highest priority on the development of a national energy policy which our country has never had. That's why we must win the struggle against inflation, and I've been very pleased lately at the trend in interest rates and the good news we had this morning on the Producer Price Index (Applause). The Congress and I are moving resolutely toward this goal. In fact, every single American is involved. This common effort to deal with the worldwide economic challenge does require some sacrifice and I am determined that the sacrifice will be fairly shared. The response of our democracy to economic challenges will determine whether we will be able to manage the challenge of other global responsibilities in the 1980s and beyond. If we cannot meet these international economic problems successfully, then our ability to meet military and political and diplomatic challenges will be doubtful indeed. Although it will not be easy, the innate advantages of our nation's natural bounty which God has given us and the common commitment of a free people who compromise American society give us the assurance of success.

"We must also be militarily strong. The fact is that for 15 years the Soviet Union has been expanding its military capabilities far out of proportion to its needs for defense -- a 4 or 5 percent real growth above the inflation rate compounded annually for 15 years has caused us some concern. For much of this same period, our spending for defense had been going down. If these adverse trends had continued, we would have found ourselves facing a severe military imbalance, an imbalance all the more threatening because of mounting global turbulence. That's why I have launched a broad modernization of our strategic and conventional forces and worked to strengthen our alliances. We and our allies have pledged ourselves to sustained real annual increases in our defense spending.

"Our task is to build together a truly cooperative global community, to compose a kind of global mosaic which embraces the wealth and diversity of the Earth's people, cultures and religions. This will not be an easy task. The philosophical basis of such a community must be respect for human rights as well as respect for the independence of nations.

"In promoting that prospect for a future of peace, we will stay on the steady course to which we have been committed now for the last three and a half years.

"We pursue five major objectives:

"First, to enhance not only economic but also political solidarity among the industrialized democracies.

"Second, to establish a genuinely cooperative relationship with the nations of the Third World.

"Third, to persevere in our efforts for peace in the Middle East and other troubled areas of the world.

"Fourth, to defend our strategic interests, especially those which are now threatened in Southwest Asia.

"And fifth, to advance arms control, especially through agreed strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union, and to maintain along with this a firm and a balanced relationship with the Soviets.

"Our first objective, solidarity with our Allies, is the touchstone of our foreign policy. Without such solidarity, the world economy and international politics may well degenerate into disorder.

"This is why we have led the North Atlantic Alliance in its program to upgrade its conventional forces. And last winter, in an historic decision, NATO agreed to strengthen its nuclear missiles in Europe in order to respond to a very disturbing Soviet missile buildup there.

"Next month, the seven leading industrial democracies will hold a summit meeting in Venice. I look forward to being there with the other six leaders of our most important Allies. It's our collective intention not only to make the summit another milestone for global economic cooperation, but also to advance our political and our strategic solidarity."

World Affairs Council
Philadelphia
May 1980

Administration Record in Foreign Policy

We have a strong and good record: peace in the Middle East -- the most crucial area -- which provides us with a basis for dealing with an outrageous situation in Afghanistan. Nothing puts us in a better position for dealing with this problem than the Camp David Accords. Beyond that, we are improving America's strength and resolve -- in the post-Vietnam era -- both at home and abroad; relations with our key Allies have rarely been better; we have made decisive progress in peacemaking; both in the Middle East and (with the British) in southern Africa; and we have demonstrated to the world -- following Vietnam -- that we are a country that stands for its values, and are the major country others look up to.

Afghanistan is the product of fundamental Soviet miscalculation about the reaction of the entire world. It has revealed the Soviets for what they are -- not the partisans of independence and non-alignment and the whole world has brought them to account.

-- Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is the result of a disastrous failure of Soviet policy. That is the way it is perceived by virtually every nation in the world, and I am sure that is how it will come to be seen in the Kremlin in time.

I have drawn the line in the region and the response of other countries has been very gratifying, including those who are prepared to provide necessary facilities.

-- In defense, I reversed a decade's decline in real defense spending, and we are now making steady increases in the face of 15 years of major Soviet defense increases. We created the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, a major achievement; and we now also agree to deploy long-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

-- External factors -- the growth of Soviet power and arrogance, spreading turmoil in parts of the developing world -- have complicated this task, but we have been putting together the essential building blocks for the future. Specifically: 5% real growth in defense spending; NATO Long-Term Defense Program; negotiating SALT II normalization with China; Camp David; southern Africa peace-making; Panama Canal Treaties; Multilateral Trade Agreement; Seven-nation Summits; Common Fund.

-- There is much left to be done. Most important is realizing as a nation the critical importance to us of the Persian Gulf/southwest Asia area, and the need to convince the Soviet Union of its mistake in believing that we are too preoccupied with our domestic problems to resist the further expansion of its powers abroad.

I have heard and read recently a lot about a strong America. We are strong, and I intend to see that we stay that way. But words are cheap.

It does no good to talk about a strong America and oppose a strong defense.

You can't attack inflation with brave words while you vote for larger deficits.

Anyone can be in favor of a "firm response," so long as the response is not controversial, and we certainly will never end our addiction to OPEC oil by promising the American people cheap, plentiful energy in the years ahead.

SALT

Reagan's Early Position -- Objections

Reagan opposed the SALT II Treaty as it was negotiated by both the Ford and Carter administrations. His objections, even before the details of the Treaty were known, were on the grounds that it would allow the Soviets to achieve nuclear parity.

"We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength than we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to enter a SALT II agreement. They have reason to be worried about a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge technological lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise missile...The best way to have an equitable SALT II agreement is to negotiate from a firmly established position. We should not be so eager for an agreement that we make unnecessary concessions, for to grant such concessions is to whet the Soviet appetite for more."

New York Times
February 11, 1976

Reagan then changed his objections. He no longer objected to Soviet parity but rather he claimed the Soviets would become superior to the United States.

"President Carter and his supporters in the Congress ...are negotiating a SALT II treaty that could very well make this nation NUMBER TWO behind the Soviet Union in defense and offense capability."

Ronald Reagan Letter
February, 1979

Reagan did not change this latter objection and used it as a standard campaign line.

"SALT II is not strategic arms limitation. It is strategic arms buildup, with the Soviets adding a minimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their inventory..."

New York Times
September 16, 1979

Reagan's Current Position -- Proposals

In late 1979, Reagan began to add his own SALT proposals to his criticism of SALT II. Where at first he had objected to the Soviets achieving nuclear parity, in 1979 he began to advocate a new policy.

"...(an) arms limitation agreement that legitimately reduces nuclear armaments to the point that neither country represents a threat to the other."

San Jose Mercury
September 16, 1979

By early 1980, Reagan was joining his standard criticism of SALT II with his proposal of first achieving military superiority, and then negotiating a nuclear arms reduction treaty.

"We also should have learned the lesson that we cannot negotiate arms control agreements that will slow down the Soviet military buildup, as long as we let the Soviets move ahead of us in every category of armaments. Once we clearly demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that we are determined to compete, arms control negotiations will again have a chance. On such a basis, I would be prepared to negotiate vigorously for verifiable reductions in armaments, since only on such a basis could reductions be equitable."

Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Bush

"And my conviction is this--amend the Treaty; send it back, and I think this administration is wrong when they're saying (sic) there's a new arms race. Why? Because the Soviet Union is already in an arms race. They're spending 40 percent more than we are."

CBS Face the Nation
page 6
October 7, 1979

Bush

"And it's the intent of the Soviets that concerns me; and I believe that those who, in the Senate, who want to see it amended are on the right track. And I want a SALT Treaty. I prepared the national intelligence estimates for this country; I don't like what I see in this arms race. Frankly, my presidency would be aimed as much as possible at the reduction--SALT III. Not easy to do, but strength of commitment, I think, could get us there."

CBS Face the Nation
Page 7
October 7, 1979

Bush

"Can we catch the Soviets if they try to cheat? The answer is ominous for the United States. The fact is that under this treaty we are virtually unable to monitor whether the Soviets comply with its terms....When it comes to verification of SALT II, Jimmy Carter will ask us to trust the Soviets as he once asked us to trust him. But I say ...that a treaty that cannot be verified tomorrow shouldn't be ratified today,"

Wall Street Journal
July 6, 1979

Bush

"What we need is an actual reduction, not limitation in nuclear weapons."

Birmingham, AL, News
October 3, 1979

Bush

"I oppose the SALT agreement as put forward. I would amend the treaty. After a period of time, I believe the Soviets would indeed negotiate."

Vancouver, WA, Columbian
July 18, 1979

Bush

"It is not a good treaty as drafted. Our ability to verify Soviet compliance is severely diminished by the loss of (observation) stations in Iran.

"There are things the Soviets can do to make the treaty verifiable. Why aren't they willing to do them? I want to see that tested."

Columbus, OH, Citizen
Journal
October 17, 1979

Bush

"Somehow every negotiation should push the Soviets for far more meaningful reductions....I'd be prepared as president to go a long way toward real reductions and real verifiable limits....A SALT III treaty is really a lot more important and meaningful than SALT II. So don't get caught in a bad deal now. Push harder for better SALT II terms."

Bush

"We should have SALT III, a meaningful, verifiable reduction in nuclear arms. You don't get there through a bad SALT II treaty, however."

Illinois interviews and
speeches
Champaign, Illinois
News-Gazette
February 3, 1980

Bush

"I don't like the SALT Treaty. I don't think it's a good agreement. I think the Senate should amend it or reject it. I think the Soviets would renegotiate....(the treaty) locks in inequality and can't be verified."

Carroll, IA, Daily Times-
Herald
July 2, 1979

Bush

"The Soviet economy is less than half as strong as ours, and yet they're spending 40 percent more on military matters. I don't think rejecting the treaties would mean an arms race. Their economy is already over-burdened."

Claremont, NH, Eagle-Times
August 10, 1979

Carter

"...we remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty reflects our firm conviction that the United States has a profound national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide."

State of the Union Address
January 1980